On Wed, 15 Oct 2014 17:48:35 +1000
Fraser Tweedale <ftweedal(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 01:38:09AM -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
> On Wed, 2014-10-15 at 01:15 -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
> > On Fri, 2014-10-03 at 17:54 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > Just landed a big update to the lightweight sub-CAs design
> > > proposal:
http://pki.fedoraproject.org/wiki/Lightweight_sub-CAs.
> > >
> > > I plan to start the implementing next week. Aside from general
> > > design review, specific things I need input on are:
> > >
> > > 1)
> > >
> > > How to propagate newly-generated sub-CA private keys to clones
> > > in an automated way, and how to store them.
> > >
> > I'll comment about that in the IPA thread. I had thought that the
> > keys etc. would reside in the primary CA certdb.
> >
> Actually, I'll respond here because the IPA thread has moved
> slightly away from this. In the IPA thread, there is discussion of
> storing the keys in ldap encrypted by some master key - which
> presumably would be stored in the certdb.
>
> Decrypting the signing key and keeping it in memory is absolutely a
> no-no. The CA signing key material should only be present in the
> HSM/softoken - and should never be exposed unencryted outside the
> token. All crypto operations must be done there. That most likely
> means storing the data in the NSS certdb.
>
The design of key distribution could follow the DNSSEC design; see
Petr Spacek's comments in this thread:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/freeipa-devel/2014-October/msg00080.html
Presumably this design for key distribution has received some
thorough attention. Perhaps some of the assumption for DNSSEC do
not hold for Dogtag. I have copied Petr and Simo for their input.
We use a softHSM for the DNSSEC stuff (in theory can be replaced by a
hw HSM too), and keys are handed within it only.
Simo.
--
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York