On 09/14/2011 10:00 AM, Andrew Wnuk wrote:
On 09/14/2011 09:10 AM, Chandrasekar Kannan wrote:
> On 09/14/2011 08:42 AM, Andrew Wnuk wrote:
>> On 09/14/2011 05:31 AM, Chandrasekar Kannan wrote:
>>> On 09/13/2011 05:48 PM, Andrew Wnuk wrote:
>>>> On 09/13/2011 06:41 AM, Adam Young wrote:
>>>>> The Layout of the PKI project is very unusual for a Java Server
>>>>> application.
>>>>
>>>>> I'm trying to understand the rationale for some of the things
>>>>> that were done.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why do we create a separate server instance for each subsystem?
>>>>
>>>> Because each subsystem is a standalone server.
>>>
>>> I'm not sure if it needs to be a stand alone server. It was
>>> designed and implemented as such
>>> starting 10 years ago. It might be very well be a separated name
>>> space uri inside the same tomcat instance.
>>
>> They are standalone servers for reliability and availability
>> reasons, so single tomcat failure is not going to knock down all
>> your servers at the same time.
>
> That is easily avoided by cloning...
Standalone servers are even more reliable with cloning. They are more
modular and provide bigger flexibility in designing deployments. For
example, ratio 1:1 between CAs and DRMs is not necessarily the best as
we learned from big deployments.
(sorry, I missed "not" in the original answer)
As we know being modular provides flexibility _only at a cost_. The cost
of deploying more and more instances is high and having to maintain them
as well.
Rather consolidating these "services" into one server seems like a good
approach to me. When we start talking about 1:1, I start thinking along
these lines..
- What good can a DRM do when its associated CA is offline anyways -
it cant archive. So there goes 50% of its functionality..
- What good can a TPS do when its 1:1 associated services like tks,drm
are offline. Might as well be a single server.
- What good can a OCSP be when its associated CA is offline. Serve
OCSP requests based on stale data?.
IMHO this modular design has brought in unnecessary complexity to a PKI
topology which could be simplified by consolidating these services
together in a single container.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Is a reason to continue doing so?
>>>>
>>>> It provides great flexibility in deploying Certificate Server
>>>
>>> The same level of flexibility can be achieved even with a single
>>> tomcat instance provided that instance configuration at install
>>> time takes care of tweaking stuff.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Is using different ports for CA and DRM (an so forth) merely an
>>>>> artifact of using multiple servers, or is there an additional
>>>>> reason to do so?
>>>>
>>>> Pkicreate tool allows selecting any ports. Pkicreate also
>>>> suggests ports for out of the box ease of use.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Do we expect the same user to have and user different
>>>>> certificates for different servers,
>>>>
>>>> This is a matter of deployment strategy.
>>>>
>>>>> such that the certificate then becomes a union of authentication
>>>>> and authorization?
>>>>
>>>> Certificates are the source of identity. Authorization is a
>>>> separate process based on verified identity.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Is there a reason to separate the CA and DRM Directory servers?
>>>>
>>>> Protection of archived keys.
>>>
>>> They could even stay protected - if there's a plan to consolidate.
>>> In my mind Separation != protection.
>>
>> Separation is not equal protection, but it allows to apply
>> appropriate protection standards to specific data.
>
> I'm yet to hear how it cannot be achieved otherwise when consolidated..
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Is it a "best practice" to do so? What would be the
>>>>> implications of using a single instance for both?
>>>>>
>>>>> Is there any reason why the CA uses an LDAP server instead of a
>>>>> Relational Database?
>>>>
>>>> X509 certificates are using the same distinguished names as LDAP.
>>>> Many identity products are based on directories.
>>>> Provides very secure access options.
>>>> Provides robust replication over secure channel.
>>>>
>>>>> Do we expect people to make queries dircetyl against the CA
>>>>> DirSrv,
>>>>
>>>> No
>>>>
>>>>> or is the Database best hidden from public view?
>>>>>
>>>>> Why do we split the build process up into multiple Source RPMS?
>>>>
>>>>> Is there a reason to maintain this split?
>>>>>
>>>>> Are there design documents or discussions for these decisions?
>>>>
>>>> Yes, please look for "Legacy Certificate Management System
>>>> Website" on the internal CS wiki.
>>>
>>> Sorry I dug through that pile. None answered the first question
>>> still so far for me. Why are these separate instances to begin with ?.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>> Pki-devel(a)redhat.com
>>>>>
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/pki-devel
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>
>>
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>