4:01 p.m.
Hi Jamil,
We branched off of JSS 4.2.6 and created several patches ever since.
Merging with upstream JSS (4.3) has been planned to be done within the
next year also. Until then, we are not able to provide information with
confidence on how JSS4.3 would work with our current releases. If any
Dogtag community member has tried and has answer for you, it would be
great.
Christina
On 10/10/2012 09:54 AM, Nimeh, Jamil wrote:
[Re-reply to include pki-devel(a)redhat.com <mailto:pki-devel@redhat.com>]
Hi Christina, sorry for taking so long to get back to you. I can file
this against JSS, but given that it's a down-rev version (4.2.6) and
appears to be fixed in JSS 4.3, is it worth filing this?
I guess the bigger question that affects SHA-2 algorithms as they are
implemented in Dogtag is whether or not I can safely use JSS 4.3 with
Dogtag 9.0.x? 4.2.6 is what appears to be the latest rev in the F15
yum repositories. Do you (or anyone on your team maybe) know if there
are incompatibilities between JSS 4.2.6 and 4.3 that would break a
Dogtag 9 installation?
If it can work the areas that this would affect would be:
* Proper creation of SCEP CertRep messages when using SHA-2 algs
* The ability to sign OCSP responses using something other than
SHA-1 (can that be changed? I don't see a tuneable for this)
* The ability to submit CMC revocation messages using SHA-2 and
have it properly validated before acting on it in the CA.
There might be other areas as well (maybe in other CMC related
functions) but those three areas are the ones I've run into.
Thanks,
Jamil
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* pki-users-bounces(a)redhat.com [pki-users-bounces(a)redhat.com] on
behalf of Christina Fu [cfu(a)redhat.com]
*Sent:* Monday, October 01, 2012 1:22 PM
*To:* pki-users(a)redhat.com
*Subject:* Re: [Pki-users] SHA-256 signed CMC revocation messages
failing to verify on server
Hi Jamil,
I see the issue now. I agree there is an issue with the OID. In
fact, the hashalg (2) is missing from not just SHA256, but also SHA384
and SHA512 as well.
Please go ahead and file a bug for JSS so it could be scheduled for
future release. It will probably be automatically assigned to me by
default.
thanks,
Christina
On 09/27/2012 09:34 AM, Christina Fu wrote:
> Hi Jamil,
>
> I am running a variant of jss-4.2.6-23 (with one extra patch that I
> have not had time to push/build, but it has nothing to do with your
> suspected area). For nss, I'm running nss-3.13.5-8.el5. Again, I
> develop on RHEL.
>
> Yes, if you'd send in your code with precise reproducing steps, I
> might be able to look into it sooner.
>
> Christina
>
> On 09/25/2012 11:10 PM, Nimeh, Jamil wrote:
>> Hi Christina, thank you very much for getting back to me.
>>
>> I haven't seen the problem with the PKCS#1 SHA-256 with RSA OID.
>> That seems to work across the board with JSS and Dogtag (otherwise I
>> could never sign a cert with SHA-256, I suppose). I'd be curious to
>> know what version of JSS is on your RHEL/RHCS8.1 machine, and
>> perhaps what NSS version. On my Fedora box it's JSS 4.2.6 and NSS
>> 3.13.4. Maybe something different between the bits we're running?
>>
>> I've run into the issue when a PKCS#7 or CMS signedData message is
>> created. In those cases, the SHA-256 OID would normally be asserted
>> in two locations:
>> 1. In the DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers segment of the SignedData
>> object (see RFC 5652 5.1): CMS/PKCS#7 objects have it properly
>> asserted here.
>>
>> 2. In the DigestAlgorithmIdentifier portion of the SignerInfo (see
>> RFC 5652 5.3): This is where the OID gets messed up with SHA-2
>> algs. Since there is only one signer, the
>> DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers section at the beginning would have only
>> one OID, the SHA-256 one, and that OID should be repeated again in
>> the SignerInfo.
>>
>> What happens though is that the SignerInfo's
>> DigestAlgorithmIdentifier will show up with an OID of
>> 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 when it should be 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. This
>> appears to happen with JSS 4.2.6, but not with JSS 4.3. But 4.2.6
>> is what comes down when the dogtag packages are pulled with yum, so
>> I wasn't sure if I could pop in a newer JSS safely.
>>
>> Tomorrow I'll take my doctored up CMCRevoke and cook up two
>> messages, one where I load the 4.2.6 JSS and one where I do 4.3 and
>> I'll send you the DER encodings so you can see what I'm talking
>> about. I don't recall, but I think the bug report for 824624 might
>> have sample SCEP CertRep messages from the CA, which show the issue
>> using PKCS#7.
>>
>> Once again, thank you very much for taking the time to look at this.
>>
>> --Jamil
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> *From:* pki-users-bounces(a)redhat.com [pki-users-bounces(a)redhat.com]
>> on behalf of Christina Fu [cfu(a)redhat.com]
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 25, 2012 8:46 PM
>> *To:* pki-users(a)redhat.com
>> *Subject:* Re: [Pki-users] SHA-256 signed CMC revocation messages
>> failing to verify on server
>>
>> Hi Jamil,
>>
>> I tried to reproduce your issue, but I seemed to be able to generate
>> CMC revocation request with SHA-256 digest. I have to admit that my
>> main development machine is RHEL and I work on RHCS8.1 tree.
>>
>> I changed all "SHA1" to "SHA256" in CMCRevoke.java (with the
>> exception with DSA), compiled, and it just worked. Did you do
>> anything different?
>>
>> I could see in dumpasn1 where SHA245 is in place:
>> C-Sequence (13)
>> Object Identifier (9)
>> 1 2 840 113549 1 1 11 (PKCS #1 SHA-256 With RSA
Encryption)
>> NULL (0)
>> Christina
>>
>> On 09/19/2012 11:19 AM, Christina Fu wrote:
>>> Hi Jamil,
>>>
>>> We made an effort to support SHA2 where we can but might have
>>> missed a few places. I'll look into this and hopefully be able to
>>> get back to you in a few days.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Christina
>>>
>>> On 09/19/2012 12:44 AM, Nimeh, Jamil wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hello Dogtag Gurus,
>>>>
>>>> I have been trying to issue CMC revocation messages signed with
>>>> SHA-256, but the server fails to validate the message in the
>>>> CMCAuth java policy module. If I leave all fields the same but
>>>> change the signature algorithm to SHA-1 then everything seems to
>>>> work fine.
>>>>
>>>> I suspect this is another side-effect of the root-cause for bug
>>>> 824624. It seems like in certain cases with JSS 4.2.6 when PKCS#7
>>>> messages are created using any of the SHA-2 variants, the OIDs get
>>>> messed up. This happened with SCEP responses from the CA (the bug
>>>> referenced above) and I had it happen with the CMC revoke
>>>> modifications I made. The latter issue was fixed by pulling down
>>>> JSS 4.3 and loading that jar in the classpath for the modified
>>>> CMCRevoke tool. However, on the server side I ended up seeing
>>>> verification failures.
>>>>
>>>> I'm running pki-common-9.0.20, jss 4.2.6, and NSS 3.13.4. At one
>>>> point I had heard that Dogtag 9.0.X wasn't 100% safe to run with
>>>> JSS 4.3 or later. Is that still the case with the latest 9.0
>>>> packages?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Has anyone had any success generating these CMC messages using
>>>> SHA-2 hash algs and getting Dogtag to accept them?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>
>>>> Jamil
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Pki-users mailing list
>>>> Pki-users(a)redhat.com
>>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/pki-users
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Pki-users mailing list
>>> Pki-users(a)redhat.com
>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/pki-users
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Pki-users mailing list
> Pki-users(a)redhat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/pki-users
5:15 p.m.
New subject: SHA-256 signed CMC revocation messages failing to verify on server
Thanks Christina for the feedback. I guess I can give it a try and see what happens. At
some point I may have to look into pushing forward to Dogtag 10/Fedora 18 and see if those
same issues occur on a newer system. Given that you ran similar tests on other systems
and didn't see what I found on F15 maybe an updated system will work. I'll give
it a try when I have some spare cycles and let you know.
Thanks,
Jamil
________________________________
From: Christina Fu [cfu(a)redhat.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:01 PM
To: Nimeh, Jamil
Cc: pki-devel(a)redhat.com; pki-users(a)redhat.com
Subject: Re: [Pki-users] SHA-256 signed CMC revocation messages failing to verify on
server
Hi Jamil,
We branched off of JSS 4.2.6 and created several patches ever since. Merging with
upstream JSS (4.3) has been planned to be done within the next year also. Until then, we
are not able to provide information with confidence on how JSS4.3 would work with our
current releases. If any Dogtag community member has tried and has answer for you, it
would be great.
Christina
On 10/10/2012 09:54 AM, Nimeh, Jamil wrote:
[Re-reply to include pki-devel@redhat.com<mailto:pki-devel@redhat.com>]
Hi Christina, sorry for taking so long to get back to you. I can file this against JSS,
but given that it's a down-rev version (4.2.6) and appears to be fixed in JSS 4.3, is
it worth filing this?
I guess the bigger question that affects SHA-2 algorithms as they are implemented in
Dogtag is whether or not I can safely use JSS 4.3 with Dogtag 9.0.x? 4.2.6 is what
appears to be the latest rev in the F15 yum repositories. Do you (or anyone on your team
maybe) know if there are incompatibilities between JSS 4.2.6 and 4.3 that would break a
Dogtag 9 installation?
If it can work the areas that this would affect would be:
* Proper creation of SCEP CertRep messages when using SHA-2 algs
* The ability to sign OCSP responses using something other than SHA-1 (can that be
changed? I don't see a tuneable for this)
* The ability to submit CMC revocation messages using SHA-2 and have it properly
validated before acting on it in the CA.
There might be other areas as well (maybe in other CMC related functions) but those three
areas are the ones I've run into.
Thanks,
Jamil
________________________________
From: pki-users-bounces@redhat.com<mailto:pki-users-bounces@redhat.com>
[pki-users-bounces@redhat.com<mailto:pki-users-bounces@redhat.com>] on behalf of
Christina Fu [cfu@redhat.com<mailto:cfu@redhat.com>]
Sent: Monday, October 01, 2012 1:22 PM
To: pki-users@redhat.com<mailto:pki-users@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Pki-users] SHA-256 signed CMC revocation messages failing to verify on
server
Hi Jamil,
I see the issue now. I agree there is an issue with the OID. In fact, the hashalg (2) is
missing from not just SHA256, but also SHA384 and SHA512 as well.
Please go ahead and file a bug for JSS so it could be scheduled for future release. It
will probably be automatically assigned to me by default.
thanks,
Christina
On 09/27/2012 09:34 AM, Christina Fu wrote:
Hi Jamil,
I am running a variant of jss-4.2.6-23 (with one extra patch that I have not had time to
push/build, but it has nothing to do with your suspected area). For nss, I'm running
nss-3.13.5-8.el5. Again, I develop on RHEL.
Yes, if you'd send in your code with precise reproducing steps, I might be able to
look into it sooner.
Christina
On 09/25/2012 11:10 PM, Nimeh, Jamil wrote:
Hi Christina, thank you very much for getting back to me.
I haven't seen the problem with the PKCS#1 SHA-256 with RSA OID. That seems to work
across the board with JSS and Dogtag (otherwise I could never sign a cert with SHA-256, I
suppose). I'd be curious to know what version of JSS is on your RHEL/RHCS8.1 machine,
and perhaps what NSS version. On my Fedora box it's JSS 4.2.6 and NSS 3.13.4. Maybe
something different between the bits we're running?
I've run into the issue when a PKCS#7 or CMS signedData message is created. In those
cases, the SHA-256 OID would normally be asserted in two locations:
1. In the DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers segment of the SignedData object (see RFC 5652 5.1):
CMS/PKCS#7 objects have it properly asserted here.
2. In the DigestAlgorithmIdentifier portion of the SignerInfo (see RFC 5652 5.3): This is
where the OID gets messed up with SHA-2 algs. Since there is only one signer, the
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers section at the beginning would have only one OID, the SHA-256
one, and that OID should be repeated again in the SignerInfo.
What happens though is that the SignerInfo's DigestAlgorithmIdentifier will show up
with an OID of 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1 when it should be 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. This
appears to happen with JSS 4.2.6, but not with JSS 4.3. But 4.2.6 is what comes down when
the dogtag packages are pulled with yum, so I wasn't sure if I could pop in a newer
JSS safely.
Tomorrow I'll take my doctored up CMCRevoke and cook up two messages, one where I load
the 4.2.6 JSS and one where I do 4.3 and I'll send you the DER encodings so you can
see what I'm talking about. I don't recall, but I think the bug report for 824624
might have sample SCEP CertRep messages from the CA, which show the issue using PKCS#7.
Once again, thank you very much for taking the time to look at this.
--Jamil
________________________________
From: pki-users-bounces@redhat.com<mailto:pki-users-bounces@redhat.com>
[pki-users-bounces@redhat.com<mailto:pki-users-bounces@redhat.com>] on behalf of
Christina Fu [cfu@redhat.com<mailto:cfu@redhat.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2012 8:46 PM
To: pki-users@redhat.com<mailto:pki-users@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Pki-users] SHA-256 signed CMC revocation messages failing to verify on
server
Hi Jamil,
I tried to reproduce your issue, but I seemed to be able to generate CMC revocation
request with SHA-256 digest. I have to admit that my main development machine is RHEL and
I work on RHCS8.1 tree.
I changed all "SHA1" to "SHA256" in CMCRevoke.java (with the exception
with DSA), compiled, and it just worked. Did you do anything different?
I could see in dumpasn1 where SHA245 is in place:
C-Sequence (13)
Object Identifier (9)
1 2 840 113549 1 1 11 (PKCS #1 SHA-256 With RSA Encryption)
NULL (0)
Christina
On 09/19/2012 11:19 AM, Christina Fu wrote:
Hi Jamil,
We made an effort to support SHA2 where we can but might have missed a few places.
I'll look into this and hopefully be able to get back to you in a few days.
thanks,
Christina
On 09/19/2012 12:44 AM, Nimeh, Jamil wrote:
Hello Dogtag Gurus,
I have been trying to issue CMC revocation messages signed with SHA-256, but the server
fails to validate the message in the CMCAuth java policy module. If I leave all fields
the same but change the signature algorithm to SHA-1 then everything seems to work fine.
I suspect this is another side-effect of the root-cause for bug 824624. It seems like in
certain cases with JSS 4.2.6 when PKCS#7 messages are created using any of the SHA-2
variants, the OIDs get messed up. This happened with SCEP responses from the CA (the bug
referenced above) and I had it happen with the CMC revoke modifications I made. The
latter issue was fixed by pulling down JSS 4.3 and loading that jar in the classpath for
the modified CMCRevoke tool. However, on the server side I ended up seeing verification
failures.
I'm running pki-common-9.0.20, jss 4.2.6, and NSS 3.13.4. At one point I had heard
that Dogtag 9.0.X wasn't 100% safe to run with JSS 4.3 or later. Is that still the
case with the latest 9.0 packages?
Has anyone had any success generating these CMC messages using SHA-2 hash algs and getting
Dogtag to accept them?
Thanks,
Jamil
_______________________________________________
Pki-users mailing list
Pki-users@redhat.com<mailto:Pki-users@redhat.com>
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/pki-users
_______________________________________________
Pki-users mailing list
Pki-users@redhat.com<mailto:Pki-users@redhat.com>
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/pki-users
_______________________________________________
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