Couple of comments .. 1. First off, there is a typo in the comments on the method. I think you mean .. 3. Either we WERE the issuing CA, or we .. rather than "were not" 2. We can go with the heuristic of taking the first CA, but I do not think we should leak information about other certs if the CA is incorrect. The way the code is now, we will still return data on whether a particular cert serial number is valid -- even if that cert was not issued on that CA. A simple solution is to simply pass code to processRequest() to ignore the request if the issuer is not correct and not return a response for that request. Ade On Thu, 2015-10-01 at 22:51 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Well, it would help to attach the patch :)
On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 10:43:51PM +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Hi all,
The attached patch makes sure that the right authority is used to create OCSP responses. Note that OCSP requests may ask about certs from more than one issuer - even though this is crazy the heuristic used is to simply use issuer of the first CertID in the request.
Note that OCSP response validation of certificates issued by sub -CAs currently fails due to a separate issue[1].
[1] https://fedorahosted.org/pki/ticket/1632
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