On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 03:58:51PM +0200, Petr Spacek wrote:
On 15.10.2014 14:48, Simo Sorce wrote:
On Wed, 15 Oct 2014 17:48:35 +1000 Fraser Tweedale <ftweedal@redhat.com> wrote:
On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 01:38:09AM -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
On Wed, 2014-10-15 at 01:15 -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
On Fri, 2014-10-03 at 17:54 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Hi all,
Just landed a big update to the lightweight sub-CAs design proposal: http://pki.fedoraproject.org/wiki/Lightweight_sub-CAs.
I plan to start the implementing next week. Aside from general design review, specific things I need input on are:
1)
How to propagate newly-generated sub-CA private keys to clones in an automated way, and how to store them.
I'll comment about that in the IPA thread. I had thought that the keys etc. would reside in the primary CA certdb.
Actually, I'll respond here because the IPA thread has moved slightly away from this. In the IPA thread, there is discussion of storing the keys in ldap encrypted by some master key - which presumably would be stored in the certdb.
Decrypting the signing key and keeping it in memory is absolutely a no-no. The CA signing key material should only be present in the HSM/softoken - and should never be exposed unencryted outside the token. All crypto operations must be done there. That most likely means storing the data in the NSS certdb.
The design of key distribution could follow the DNSSEC design; see Petr Spacek's comments in this thread: https://www.redhat.com/archives/freeipa-devel/2014-October/msg00080.html Presumably this design for key distribution has received some thorough attention. Perhaps some of the assumption for DNSSEC do not hold for Dogtag. I have copied Petr and Simo for their input.
We use a softHSM for the DNSSEC stuff (in theory can be replaced by a hw HSM too), and keys are handed within it only.
We are finishing DNSSEC right so I don't have time to study sub-CA design right now. For this reason I'm replying only with general statements:
- SoftHSM can be used as generic purpose token with PKCS#11 interface. - It supports multiple "PKCS#11 slots" in single SoftHSM installation so data can be separated as necessary: Each "slot" stores data in separate directory (with potentially different filesystem permissions, PINs etc.) - Upstream is responsive and accepts patches with new features (i.e. unimplemented pieces of PKCS#11 standard) without problems. - SoftHSM v2 code could use some cleanup but it has clear design and structure and I don't see extensibility problems. - Storage & crypto backends have clearly defined API so it should be possible to implement own back-ends (LDAP & NSS, if necessary).
Generally I don't see a reason why it couldn't not be used for as key storage mechanism for replicas (sub-CA keys, KDC master key, etc.) or even for clients (GNOME keyring backed with SSSD-SoftHSM tandem).
-- Petr^2 Spacek
Thanks Simo and Petr for your input. After some more investigation it looks like all the crypto in Dogtag, including for KRA etc, is performed within the ``CryptoManager`` facility. With that in mind, I've got a more concrete implementation proposal that also uses ``CryptoManager``. If it proves insufficient I will embark on a more detailed analysis of feasibility/implications of bringing SoftHSM as a Dogtag dependency (and remain open to other key distribution ideas). One difference between the DNSSEC/SoftHSM design is that the master key has to be unwrapped each time a sub-CA key needs to be installed. This was because I couldn't see a way to store and retrieve a specific SymmetricKey in CryptoManager/CryptoToken. If there's a way to do this and I've just overlooked it, let me know. But I don't think the security of the scheme is impacted ; it just means that there's a bit of repeated work when we import sub-CA keys from the database. Direct link to key distribution implementation detail in the design proposal: http://pki.fedoraproject.org/wiki/Lightweight_sub-CAs#CryptoManager_based_im... Cheers, Fraser