[PATCH] 0048-0049 Lightweight CAs: implement deletion
The attached patches fix some incorrect synchronization of the lightweight CAs index (patch 0048) and implement deletion of lightweight CAs (patch 0049). These patches replace earlier patches 0048 and 0049 which I rescind. There is a commented out throw in CertificateAuthority.deleteAuthority(); I don't yet understand what causes this failure case but a) everything seems to work (at least with the small numbers of lightweight CAs I've tested with) and b) I'm seeking clarification from NSS experts on the matter, so stay tuned. Cheers, Fraser
ACK on synchronization patch. On the delete patch, a few comments. 1) It would be good to know what is going on with the exception. 2) The new acls and mappings reminded me that upgrade scripts are required to allow old 10.x servers to be able to create subcas. Please open a ticket if one does not yet exist. 3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option). 4) Please open an auditing ticket if one is not already opened. We definitely need to be auditing everything here in detail. 5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas: a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say). b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable. CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki-server commands or similar. c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them. d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete. ... others? Ade On Wed, 2015-09-30 at 01:25 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
The attached patches fix some incorrect synchronization of the lightweight CAs index (patch 0048) and implement deletion of lightweight CAs (patch 0049).
These patches replace earlier patches 0048 and 0049 which I rescind.
There is a commented out throw in CertificateAuthority.deleteAuthority(); I don't yet understand what causes this failure case but a) everything seems to work (at least with the small numbers of lightweight CAs I've tested with) and b) I'm seeking clarification from NSS experts on the matter, so stay tuned.
Cheers, Fraser
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 12:17:23AM -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
ACK on synchronization patch.
Thanks, pushed to master (2cc4977).
On the delete patch, a few comments.
1) It would be good to know what is going on with the exception.
It would. Investigations will continue. As discussed on IRC, *if* the patch is merged with this wart, I will open a ticket to track.
2) The new acls and mappings reminded me that upgrade scripts are required to allow old 10.x servers to be able to create subcas. Please open a ticket if one does not yet exist.
Ticket: https://fedorahosted.org/pki/ticket/1630
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
Will do.
4) Please open an auditing ticket if one is not already opened. We definitely need to be auditing everything here in detail.
Ticket: https://fedorahosted.org/pki/ticket/1629
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say).
Disagree; don't want more config in flat files. Having the knob in the database would be better but I prefer a combination of other options (see below).
b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki-server commands or similar.
c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them.
I'm in favour of this.
d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete.
And in favour of this.
... others?
I like (c) plus (d) plus perhaps a pkispawn knob that controls whether the admin-can-delete ACL gets added at the beginning. Let me know what you think and thanks for your feedback! Fraser
Ade
On Wed, 2015-09-30 at 01:25 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
The attached patches fix some incorrect synchronization of the lightweight CAs index (patch 0048) and implement deletion of lightweight CAs (patch 0049).
These patches replace earlier patches 0048 and 0049 which I rescind.
There is a commented out throw in CertificateAuthority.deleteAuthority(); I don't yet understand what causes this failure case but a) everything seems to work (at least with the small numbers of lightweight CAs I've tested with) and b) I'm seeking clarification from NSS experts on the matter, so stay tuned.
Cheers, Fraser
Updated patch attached. Comments inline. On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 06:35:57PM +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
Will do.
Done.
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say).
Disagree; don't want more config in flat files. Having the knob in the database would be better but I prefer a combination of other options (see below).
b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki-server commands or similar.
c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them.
I'm in favour of this.
d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete.
And in favour of this.
... others?
I like (c) plus (d) plus perhaps a pkispawn knob that controls whether the admin-can-delete ACL gets added at the beginning.
Let me know what you think and thanks for your feedback!
(c) and (d) are implemented in updated patch. If you agree with (c) plus (d) plus pkispawn knob (I guess we'll call that (e)), I'll file a ticket for (e). Cheers, Fraser
Hi Fraser, Ade caught me on irc for some feedback. I have not had chance to look at your patches, but I did get the gist of the subca delete issues from him. Two key suggestions I have: 1. make sure the action is audited to its parent (audit log preserved) 2. make sure revocation is taken cared of of the subca's signing cert (and therefore invalidating all its signed certs) - and make sure the root CA is never deleted, so that the crls could be preserved and referenced to; - and note that ocsp will no longer work for the subca that is deleted, as the signing cert is gone for good Regarding keeping the root CA, we had discussion on possibly keeping it in a "mothballed state"...I'll let Ade add to this. thanks, Christina On 09/30/2015 07:00 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Updated patch attached. Comments inline.
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 06:35:57PM +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
Will do.
Done.
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say).
Disagree; don't want more config in flat files. Having the knob in the database would be better but I prefer a combination of other options (see below).
b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki-server commands or similar.
c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them.
I'm in favour of this.
d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete.
And in favour of this.
... others?
I like (c) plus (d) plus perhaps a pkispawn knob that controls whether the admin-can-delete ACL gets added at the beginning.
Let me know what you think and thanks for your feedback!
(c) and (d) are implemented in updated patch. If you agree with (c) plus (d) plus pkispawn knob (I guess we'll call that (e)), I'll file a ticket for (e).
Cheers, Fraser
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Hi Fraser,
Ade caught me on irc for some feedback. I have not had chance to look at your patches, but I did get the gist of the subca delete issues from him. Two key suggestions I have: 1. make sure the action is audited to its parent (audit log preserved) 2. make sure revocation is taken cared of of the subca's signing cert (and therefore invalidating all its signed certs) - and make sure the root CA is never deleted, so that the crls could be preserved and referenced to; - and note that ocsp will no longer work for the subca that is deleted, as the signing cert is gone for good
Regarding keeping the root CA, we had discussion on possibly keeping it in a "mothballed state"...I'll let Ade add to this.
thanks, Christina
On 09/30/2015 07:00 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Updated patch attached. Comments inline.
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 06:35:57PM +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
Will do.
Done.
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say).
Disagree; don't want more config in flat files. Having the knob in the database would be better but I prefer a combination of other options (see below).
b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki -server commands or similar.
c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them.
I'm in favour of this.
d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete.
And in favour of this.
... others?
I like (c) plus (d) plus perhaps a pkispawn knob that controls whether the admin-can-delete ACL gets added at the beginning.
Let me know what you think and thanks for your feedback!
(c) and (d) are implemented in updated patch. If you agree with (c) plus (d) plus pkispawn knob (I guess we'll call that (e)), I'll file a ticket for (e).
I'm OK with (c) and (d) and others appear to be too. Archiving is difficult because it basically won't work with an HSM. I suppose this is just equivalent to the controls we have in revoking
On Wed, 2015-09-30 at 11:26 -0700, Christina Fu wrote: See other comments below, but the gist of Christina's comments are: 1. We need to look up the parent and revoke the subca signing cert. 2. We need to restrict Delete to Leaf CAs. So if you have Host CA -> sub ca1 -> sub ca2 -> subca 3, you cannot delete sub CA 1 without deleting subca3 and subca2 (in that order). 3. The mothballed state Christina refers to is what we now call the disabled state. In this case, we should not be able to issue new certs (including subca certs). We should however still be able to revoke certs and publish CRLs. the host CA signing cert. I don't think (e) is needed.
Cheers, Fraser
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On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 03:59:55PM -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
On Wed, 2015-09-30 at 11:26 -0700, Christina Fu wrote: See other comments below, but the gist of Christina's comments are: 1. We need to look up the parent and revoke the subca signing cert. 2. We need to restrict Delete to Leaf CAs. So if you have Host CA -> sub ca1 -> sub ca2 -> subca 3, you cannot delete sub CA 1 without deleting subca3 and subca2 (in that order). 3. The mothballed state Christina refers to is what we now call the disabled state. In this case, we should not be able to issue new certs (including subca certs). We should however still be able to revoke certs and publish CRLs.
Thanks Christina and Ade for the feedback. The updated patch (attached) addresses #1. #3 is addressed by my patch 0050 (separate thread). I will tackle revocation-on-delete next. If you are happy with what's in the attached patched we could push it and I'll file a ticket and implement revocation in a separate patch, but the call is yours. Cheers, Fraser
Hi Fraser,
Ade caught me on irc for some feedback. I have not had chance to look at your patches, but I did get the gist of the subca delete issues from him. Two key suggestions I have: 1. make sure the action is audited to its parent (audit log preserved) 2. make sure revocation is taken cared of of the subca's signing cert (and therefore invalidating all its signed certs) - and make sure the root CA is never deleted, so that the crls could be preserved and referenced to; - and note that ocsp will no longer work for the subca that is deleted, as the signing cert is gone for good
Regarding keeping the root CA, we had discussion on possibly keeping it in a "mothballed state"...I'll let Ade add to this.
thanks, Christina
On 09/30/2015 07:00 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Updated patch attached. Comments inline.
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 06:35:57PM +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
Will do.
Done.
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say).
Disagree; don't want more config in flat files. Having the knob in the database would be better but I prefer a combination of other options (see below).
b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki -server commands or similar.
c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them.
I'm in favour of this.
d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete.
And in favour of this.
... others?
I like (c) plus (d) plus perhaps a pkispawn knob that controls whether the admin-can-delete ACL gets added at the beginning.
Let me know what you think and thanks for your feedback!
(c) and (d) are implemented in updated patch. If you agree with (c) plus (d) plus pkispawn knob (I guess we'll call that (e)), I'll file a ticket for (e).
I'm OK with (c) and (d) and others appear to be too. Archiving is difficult because it basically won't work with an HSM. I suppose this is just equivalent to the controls we have in revoking the host CA signing cert. I don't think (e) is needed.
On Thu, 2015-10-01 at 22:50 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 03:59:55PM -0400, Ade Lee wrote:
On Wed, 2015-09-30 at 11:26 -0700, Christina Fu wrote: See other comments below, but the gist of Christina's comments are: 1. We need to look up the parent and revoke the subca signing cert. 2. We need to restrict Delete to Leaf CAs. So if you have Host CA -> sub ca1 -> sub ca2 -> subca 3, you cannot delete sub CA 1 without deleting subca3 and subca2 (in that order). 3. The mothballed state Christina refers to is what we now call the disabled state. In this case, we should not be able to issue new certs (including subca certs). We should however still be able to revoke certs and publish CRLs.
Thanks Christina and Ade for the feedback. The updated patch (attached) addresses #1. #3 is addressed by my patch 0050 (separate thread).
I will tackle revocation-on-delete next. If you are happy with what's in the attached patched we could push it and I'll file a ticket and implement revocation in a separate patch, but the call is yours.
I think you mean that the attached patch addresses #2 (instead of #1, which is revocation). Yes, please address revocation on delete in a separate patch. You will likely need to rebase. I was unable to apply the patch as is. On question about this patch -- In the iteration over the caMap to determine if we have a leaf node, does this need to be synchronized? Once the above is fixed (assuming that it needs to be), ACK. Cheers,
Fraser
Hi Fraser,
Ade caught me on irc for some feedback. I have not had chance to look at your patches, but I did get the gist of the subca delete issues from him. Two key suggestions I have: 1. make sure the action is audited to its parent (audit log preserved) 2. make sure revocation is taken cared of of the subca's signing cert (and therefore invalidating all its signed certs) - and make sure the root CA is never deleted, so that the crls could be preserved and referenced to; - and note that ocsp will no longer work for the subca that is deleted, as the signing cert is gone for good
Regarding keeping the root CA, we had discussion on possibly keeping it in a "mothballed state"...I'll let Ade add to this.
thanks, Christina
On 09/30/2015 07:00 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
Updated patch attached. Comments inline.
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 06:35:57PM +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
Will do.
Done.
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say).
Disagree; don't want more config in flat files. Having the knob in the database would be better but I prefer a combination of other options (see below).
b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki -server commands or similar.
c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them.
I'm in favour of this.
d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete.
And in favour of this.
... others?
I like (c) plus (d) plus perhaps a pkispawn knob that controls whether the admin-can-delete ACL gets added at the beginning.
Let me know what you think and thanks for your feedback!
(c) and (d) are implemented in updated patch. If you agree with (c) plus (d) plus pkispawn knob (I guess we'll call that (e)), I'll file a ticket for (e).
I'm OK with (c) and (d) and others appear to be too. Archiving is difficult because it basically won't work with an HSM. I suppose this is just equivalent to the controls we have in revoking the host CA signing cert. I don't think (e) is needed.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ade Lee" <alee@redhat.com> To: "Fraser Tweedale" <ftweedal@redhat.com>, pki-devel@redhat.com Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2015 9:17:23 PM Subject: Re: [Pki-devel] [PATCH] 0048-0049 Lightweight CAs: implement deletion
ACK on synchronization patch.
On the delete patch, a few comments.
1) It would be good to know what is going on with the exception.
2) The new acls and mappings reminded me that upgrade scripts are required to allow old 10.x servers to be able to create subcas. Please open a ticket if one does not yet exist.
3) It would be good to have a "Are you sure?" dialog on the CLI (with relevant override option).
4) Please open an auditing ticket if one is not already opened. We definitely need to be auditing everything here in detail.
Couple more: - Would it make sense to allow all in progress requests to finish before detonation? - What about a reversible delete where everything gets archived like when one deletes a program off of a DVR which can be recovered later.
5) I have been thinking about ways to restrict delete. We should discuss and decide on options. Some ideas:
a) Add CS.cfg option to disable deletes (for production say). b) Add optional field (deletable) to the CA entry. This can be set by the creating admin to be True for test environments or cases where we know the environment will be short lived, or False for long lived CAs. Default could be configurable.
CAs could still be deleted, but only by doing something out-of-band --like modifying the db entry using pki-server commands or similar. c) Requiring CAs to be disabled before deleting them. d) Setting a separate ACL for delete, so that it would be easier for admins to set special permissions for delete. ... others?
Ade
On Wed, 2015-09-30 at 01:25 +1000, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
The attached patches fix some incorrect synchronization of the lightweight CAs index (patch 0048) and implement deletion of lightweight CAs (patch 0049).
These patches replace earlier patches 0048 and 0049 which I rescind.
There is a commented out throw in CertificateAuthority.deleteAuthority(); I don't yet understand what causes this failure case but a) everything seems to work (at least with the small numbers of lightweight CAs I've tested with) and b) I'm seeking clarification from NSS experts on the matter, so stay tuned.
Cheers, Fraser
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participants (4)
-
Ade Lee -
Christina Fu -
Fraser Tweedale -
John Magne